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The collective model of labour supply opened the household “black box” and allowed for 
individual treatment of partners in couples. However, the literature on labour supply has so 
far largely ignored a broader issue with special relevance to transition and developing 
countries – the distinction of single versus multi-family (“complex”) households. We propose 
a method to account for multi-family household structure by borrowing from recent 
applications of the collective model and combining estimation and calibration to identify the 
degree of resource sharing. We assume that each household is characterised by a between-
family sharing parameter, which is calibrated on estimated preferences, the observed labour 
market status and other characteristics. The key identifying assumption is that preferences 
over income and leisure of specific family types living in single and multi-family households 
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The usual disclaimer applies. 1 Introduction
Following Grossbard-Shechtman (1984), Chiappori (1988) and Chiappori (1992), there
has been an increasing interest and a growing body of literature analysing the implica-
tions of within-household sharing of resources between individuals who constitute the
household. Chiappori’s collective model of labour supply allows for identiﬁcation of
individual preferences and a sharing rule which determines the allocation of resources
in the household.1 This is in contrast to the traditional unitary models which treat the
couple as a decision-making unit, and ignore the bargaining and allocation processes
that go on within it. The relatively straightforward application of the unitary model
in a discrete framework - especially following the method proposed by Aaberge et al.
(1995) and van Soest (1995) - make it by far the more often used. However, recent
advances in the development of the collective methodology (e.g.: Chiappori (1997)
and Blundell et al. 2005)) and successful applications of the model which combined
estimation and calibration , such as Beninger et al. (2006), have demonstrated that
ignoring the processes that take place within the household lead to misleading conclu-
sions concerning the behaviour of individuals in couples.
Although the collective model has opened the household “black box” and al-
lowed for individual treatment of partners in couples, the labour supply literature
has so far ignored a broader issue, namely the distinction between single versus multi-
family/complex households. This distinction has special relevance for developing and
transition countries, but it is also important for developed countries with more “tra-
ditional” household structures like Italy or Spain. If we deﬁne a “family” to be either
a single adult or a couple with or without dependent children then a household can be
made of more than one such family. There may of course be various combinations of
single and couple families as well as families with individuals of working-age and be-
yond it. Such combinations, with a potential for resource sharing among the families,
will have implications for the ﬁnancial situation of each family, and as a consequence,
for the ﬁnancial incentives to work faced by each member of the household.2
1For a description of the literature on within-household sharing see for example Vermeulen (2002)
and Bargain et al. (2006).
2There exists an important strand of the literature in development economics focusing on within-
household division of resources with special focus on market and non-market work (e.g. Fefchamps
and Quisumbing (2003)). The studies in development literature on intrahousehold sharing rely on
detailed data about division of labour and resource sharing between members of the household. Our
approach attempts to deal with the issue of resource sharing in “complex” households without speciﬁc
2In many developing countries but also in transition economies and several devel-
oped economies multi-family households are very common and are often an important
source of income insurance. In this respect, multi-family households partly substitute
for governmental transfer programs. Therefore, it seems that without a way to account
for sharing of resources among families within households, modelling of work incen-
tives and individual labour supply responses within such complex households may be
incorrect.
We propose a way to address this problem by borrowing from recent applications
of the collective model and combining microsimulation, estimation and calibration
methods to identify the degree of sharing among families in households. Such com-
bination has been successfully used in the context of the collective model for single
family households (e.g. Beninger et al. (2007), Myck et al. (2006), or Vermeulen et
al. (2006)). The method we develop is applied to Polish data. In Poland a substantial
proportion of single adult families and couples - both with and without children -
live in multi-family households (MFHs). To present the methodology in the clearest
way we focus in our application on the labour supply behaviour of single working age
men and women without children who live together with one other family. Singles in
Poland, in particular men, have a relatively low labour market attachment. This is
observed in parallel with very low levels of governmental out-of-work transfers. As we
demonstrated earlier (Haan and Myck (2007)) this puzzling combination of low em-
ployment and low beneﬁts can be partly explained by the large share of singles living
in MFHs who may receive intra household transfers through sharing.
The methodology we propose is contrasted with a simple extension of the “stan-
dard” model of labour supply, in which we control for characteristics of these complex
households like demographic composition and income. We demonstrate that while the
average results of our calibrated and the extended standard model are similar, the dis-
tribution of the results suggests important diﬀerences between groups. This may lead
to wrongful conclusions concerning the implications of changes in ﬁnancial incentives.
The model developed here, while focusing on single men and women, can be gen-
eralised and extended to analyse the labour supply of couples living in MFHs as well
as to MFHs with more than two families. Other standard extensions of labour supply
models, like modelling of childcare costs, could also be accounted for.
information on how resources are divided between household members.
3The approach provides only a non-structural solution to the problem of multi-
family households by using calibration. Our application focuses on a combination of a
labour-supply ﬂexible adult individual living with a family the labour supply of which
would be considered “ﬁxed” or exogenous in most labour supply applications.3 In such
combinations it is impossible to specify the standard form of the utility function over
consumption and leisure for all household members. As a consequence our method
focuses only on the identiﬁcation of the most likely ﬁnancial incentives faced by the
labour supply ﬂexible family. This implies that the degree of resource “sharing” which
we identify does not have a structural interpretation, e.g. bargaining power or egoism.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we set out the stage for the analysis
by presenting the degree and type of multi-family household arrangements in Poland.
We also specify the sub-sample of such households which our detailed analysis focuses
on in the following sections. In Section 3 we present the details of the method we
propose for the identiﬁcation of the sharing parameter in MFHs. The method is then
applied in Sections 4 and 5 in which we also present results of the analysis. Conclusions
follow in Section 6.
2 Multi-family households in Poland
The empirical analysis is based on the Polish Household Budgets’ Survey from 2005.
This is a representative survey for the Polish population with details concerning demo-
graphic information, consumption and incomes on nearly 35,000 households. The data
presents a very interesting pattern of living arrangements which seems rather unique
by the standards of most countries of the developed world. If we deﬁne a family to be
either a single adult or couple (with or without dependent children), then over 30% of
households in Poland consist of more than one family, and in over 7% of households
there are more than two. This may have important consequences for the implications
of government policy for changes in income distribution and labour market incentives.
In our data set there are 48,617 families of which 9,829 are families with at least
3Below we refer to labour supply ﬂexible families as “LS-ﬂexible” and to families without any
LS-ﬂexible individuals as “LS-ﬁxed”. In our approach individuals are assumed to be LS-ﬁxed if they
are retirement or disability pensioners, are in retirement age or full-time students. The claim of
exogeneity of the labour market position may be judged as a strong assumption. However, given the
very diﬀerent administrative and labour demand constraints faced on the labour market by those
assumed by us to be ”LS-ﬁxed” any other approach would have to rely on even stronger assumptions.
4one person of pension age; 17,344 are single working-age adult families, and 21,444 are
couples where both spouses are in working age.
Since we focus on labour supply we are principally interested in households where
at least one family is “LS-ﬂexible”, i.e. includes someone who is neither on retirement
nor disability pension and is not a student (the age restriction we apply is 25-59). We
exclude households with someone who is self-employed since it is diﬃcult to estimate
their incomes. This leaves us with a sample 19,834 families in 16,069 households.
11,601 are single-family households, while the remaining 8,233 families share their
households with other families. In the Appendix in Table 8 we present various com-
binations of living arrangements for the labour supply ﬂexible families in the sample.
Couples are divided into three sub-categories conditional on the labour market ﬂexi-
bility of either of the partners (both ﬂexible, man ﬂexible, woman ﬂexible).
As we can see while a large proportion of LS ﬂexible families live in SFHs, almost
42% share their household with other families. The largest group of those (3,797
families in the sample) shares the household with one other LS-ﬁxed family, but there
are numerous other complex household arrangements. In our analysis we focus on
single-adult families without children and we use the sample of single-family households
and the sub-sample of two-family households which include a single LS-ﬂexible adult
and another LS-ﬁxed family. In the case of single adults without children (see in Table
9 in the Appendix) the majority lives in “complex” households (75.4%), and of those
over a third live with one other LS-ﬁxed family. In the application we use the 1148
single adult families from SFHs and 1271 families from MFHs. Descriptive statistics
on the samples are presented in Tables 1 and 2 respectively for single men and single
women.
We ﬁnd interesting diﬀerences in the working behaviour for single men and women
both in MFHs and SHFs. In contrast to the working behaviour of spouses in couples,
we ﬁnd that single women without children have higher participation rate than men.
Over the combined sample of single women in MFHs and SFHs, more than 74% of
women work. In contrast, single men have a lower employment rate at 61%. It is also
interesting that single men are more likely to work part-time compared to women.
Some of these diﬀerences might be demand side driven, e.g. men tend to work in
professions with higher unemployment. Moreover, activity in the shadow economy or
seasonal work in and out of Poland might be higher for men, and this information may
5Table 1: Descriptive statistics by employment state: Single men without children
Share Average age University Town Income of other Mean inc. of
family = 0 other fam. (PLN)
Individuals in single and multi family households
Number of obs: 1177
Out of work 0.38 41.22 0.07 0.69 - -
Part-time work 0.07 40.86 0.06 0.43 - -
Full-time work 0.54 36.85 0.25 0.73 - -
All 38.79 0.17 0.69 - -
Single family households
Number of obs: 415
Out of work 0.25 48.26 0.07 0.77 - -
Part-time work 0.10 44.44 0.07 0.49 - -
Full-time work 0.64 38.86 0.35 0.82 - -
All 41.83 0.25 0.77 - -
Multi family households
Number of obs: 762
Out of work 0.46 38.92 0.08 0.66 0.00 735.24
Part-time work 0.06 37.6 0.04 0.37 0.00 577.45
Full-time work 0.48 35.41 0.17 0.67 0.02 754.91
All 37.13 0.12 0.65 0.01 740.33
Notes: “Income of other family = 0” - proportion of households where income of the LS-ﬁxed family is zero. “Mean inc
of other fam.” - mean monthly income of the LS-ﬁxed family conditional on it being positive. Statistics for multi-family
households are only for those where a single LS-ﬂexible person shares the household with an LS-ﬁxed family. PLN - Polish
zloty.
Source: Authors’ calculations using BBGD, 2005.
not be reﬂected in the data. However as men and women in couples are faced with
the same economic situation yet exhibit diﬀerent working behaviour, the supply side
is also likely to be responsible for the diﬀerent working pattern we observe.
As we can see both single men and women in SFHs are slightly older than those in
MFHs, and they are more likely to have completed university education. Single men
in SFHs are twice more likely to have a university degree compared to those in MFHs.
Singles living in MFHs are more likely to be found in villages than in the urban areas.
It is also interesting to note that education and employment levels among single family
households are higher for women compared to men.
As expected the proportion of employed individuals in SFHs is higher compared
to MFHs. This large diﬀerence provides the key motivation for our analysis. The
question we address is to what extent the multi-family household structure contributes
to weakening the ﬁnancial incentives for LS-ﬂexible individuals over and above the
consequences of them having diﬀerent observable characteristics.
6Table 2: Descriptive statistics by employment state: Single women without children
Share Average age University Town Income of other Mean inc. of
family = 0 other fam. (PLN)
Individuals in single and multi family households
Number of obs: 1242
Out of work 0.25 46.95 0.10 0.76 - -
Part-time work 0.06 43.85 0.2 0.74 - -
Full-time work 0.69 41.54 0.45 0.82 - -
All 43.03 0.35 0.80 - -
Single family households
Number of obs: 733
Out of work 0.23 51.2 0.072 0.79 - -
Part-time work 0.06 46.19 0.15 0.72 - -
Full-time work 0.71 42.56 0.49 0.88 - -
All 44.74 0.38 0.85 - -
Multi family households
Number of obs: 509
Out of work 0.28 42.02 0.13 0.74 0.07 612.05
Part-time work 0.06 41.13 0.28 0.79 0.03 666.35
Full-time work 0.66 49.97 0.40 0.73 0.07 641.81
All 40.56 0.32 0.73 0.07 634.85
Notes: “Income of other family = 0” - proportion of households where income of the LS-ﬁxed family is zero. “Mean inc
of other fam.” - mean monthly income of the LS-ﬁxed family conditional on it being positive. Statistics for multi-family
households are only for those where a single LS-ﬂexible person shares the household with an LS-ﬁxed family. PLN - Polish
zloty.
Source: Authors’ calculations using BBGD, 2005.
3 Accounting for sharing of resources in multi-family
households.
3.1 Within-household sharing of resources
In any household resources can be shared in a multitude of ways, including extreme
situations where all resources are appropriated by one household member and scenarios
where they are shared among all individuals equally. Since the families we observe live
under a “common roof” it is most likely that each of the families gets some share of
the household resources, with the roof being the least each member can get.
In our approach we shall consider a spectrum of sharing scenarios between two
extremes. One extreme is the situation in which resources are shared equally in ac-
cordance with equivalised family size (“full-sharing”), the other where every family
keeps what it has, i.e. where there is no sharing. This spectrum of sharing scenarios
7excludes the possibility that any member of the household can force the others to
part with more resources than the amount given by the “full-sharing” scenario. We
assume that there is a single sharing rule for the entire household and that sharing is
determined between families. In the case of households with more than two families
the fact that there is a single sharing rule for the household may not necessarily hold,
since there may be a greater degree of sharing between some families and less shar-
ing between others. Since in our application we focus only on two-family households
this simpliﬁcation will not aﬀect our results, but it should be considered carefully in
possible extensions. Naturally resources can be shared in any fashion falling between
“full sharing” and “no sharing”. Let’s say that a household h is made of F families
which are denoted by i. Let income of each family in the scenario with no sharing of
resources be Y NS
i , and let the equivalence weight of each family be ηi. This means













where F is the number of families in the household.
Let’s deﬁne αh to be the within-household sharing parameter for household h taking
values from 0 (“no sharing”) to 1 (“full sharing” as in equation 1). Then income of
each family, Y S










An important restriction which we have to impose is the “symmetry” of resource
sharing across employment states. The sharing parameter α which we calibrate in the
application is assumed to be stable regardless of whether a family is out of work (and
say receives income through sharing), or is in work (and may be a “net” contributor
to resources of the other family).
Naturally, family resources may substantially diﬀer depending on the degree of
sharing of resources within the household and sharing will strongly aﬀect the ﬁnancial
incentives to work for the LS-ﬂexible family. The importance sharing may have on
ﬁnancial incentives to work is presented in Figure 1 where we plot the distribution of
replacement ratios (RRs) computed at family level as ratios of out-of-work to full-time
8in-work incomes. The ﬁgures are presented separately for men and women living in
MFHs in our sample (1A and 1B respectively). With no sharing (i.e. where α=0)
both for men and for women the median replacement ratio is zero. With full sharing,
as deﬁned in equation 1, median RRs are 0.62 and 0.54, respectively, and as one could
expect the entire distributions of RRs shift to the right for higher values of the degree
of sharing.
The reason for such signiﬁcant eﬀects of sharing on ﬁnancial incentives is primarily
that in a great majority of cases the LS-ﬂexible family occupies the household with
a family with some positive value of family income (see Tables 1 and 2). Only 1%
of single LS-ﬂexible men and 8% of single LS-ﬂexible women share households with
families which do not have any income. Usually the values of (equivalised) incomes
are relatively high and they are on average higher for households with single LS-
ﬂexible men (735.60 PLN) than for those with single LS-ﬂexible women (588.40 PLN).
Interestingly the average values of incomes of LS-ﬁxed families are similar for full-
time employed and not-employed single LS-ﬂexible families. It is only for the part-
time employed that we can see some diﬀerence in the average level of LS-ﬁxed family
incomes. The part-time employed, however, represent only small fractions among the
respective family types.
Thus while resource sharing is very likely to aﬀect ﬁnancial incentives to work, its
degree cannot be observed in the data. Below we propose a way to identify the αh
parameter by combining estimated labour market preferences of SFHs families and the
observed behaviour of family members in MFHs.
3.2 Assumptions necessary to identify the sharing parameter
The identiﬁcation of individual or family preferences concerning the leisure-consumption
trade-oﬀ relies almost entirely on the correct measurement of disposable incomes in
various labour market scenarios. Without knowing how resources are shared in MFHs,
these disposable incomes cannot be reliably computed. Below we combine matching,
estimation and calibration procedures to allow for the identiﬁcation of the sharing
parameter in each MFH.
The ﬁrst step in the procedure is estimation of preference parameters for single
individuals living in SFHs. In the following we will denote families in SFHs with l.
9Here we follow the standard procedure by directly estimating preferences over leisure
and consumption using a discrete choice labour supply model.4 In the discrete choice
framework agents choose amongst J discrete alternatives of employment states.
We assume that the labour market choice of family i living in a MFH denoted with
h is a result of maximising a utility function of the following deterministic form:
V
h




hj ,αh),j ∈ {0,1,2...,J}. (3)
Zi is a vector of demographic characteristics, Lj is the leisure time at diﬀerent labour
market states j, Y NS
ij is the net income at employment state j under the assumption
of no sharing, and Y NS
hj is the net income of other household members if individual
i chooses the state j (also under the assumption of no sharing). αh is the household
sharing parameter and vector ˆ β is a set of preference parameters estimated on the pop-
ulation of individuals or single families who live in SFHs. We thus make an assumption
that conditional on Zi, preferences over income and leisure of single adult individuals
living in SFHs and MFHs are the same. Then the only unknown element necessary to
determine the labour supply behaviour of family i is αh. For identiﬁcation we make
use of the additional piece of information which is available in the data, namely the
actual labour market choice of family i in the MFHs.
The method of “borrowing” preferences from one population group and applying
it to another has been used before in the literature, recently in the application of the
collective model of labour supply in Beninger et al. (2007), Beninger et al. (2006),
Myck et al. (2006), or Vermeulen et al. (2006). In these applications the assumptions
were much stronger compared to those we make in this paper, as in these instances
preferences of single individuals (without children) were used for individuals living in
couples (with or without children). In our case we use preferences of single individuals
(without children) living in SFHs to represent preferences of singles (also without
children) in MFHs. While this is still a strong assumption it seems much less restrictive
since the samples are much more similar, and it seems much more plausible to argue
that conditional on observable characteristics preferences of these two groups of singles
are the same. In addition to observed variables, unobservable characteristics might be
diﬀerently distributed between SFHs and MFHs. In the matching procedure described
4We follow the standard assumption in this literature that families do not save nor borrow and
therefore consumption is equal to net income.
10below we have tried to account for potential unobservable eﬀects. As unobservables
could not be robustly identiﬁed, we need to rely on the assumption the unobservable
characteristics between SFHs and MFHs have the same distribution.
It is also important to note that the method we propose diﬀers from that given in
Vermeulen et al. (2006), in that our identiﬁcation of the degree of sharing does not rely
on preferences over leisure and income of both families in the households we analyse.
As we mentioned earlier this is because it is impossible to identify such preferences
for the LS-ﬁxed family. The method proposed here uses only the income information
of the LS-ﬁxed family and identiﬁes the degree of sharing within the household using
the observed labour market state of the LS-ﬂexible family. The degree of sharing
we calibrate is not derived from a structural model of within-household division of
resources, and thus should not be interpreted as a degree of power or selﬁshness of
one family versus the other. Being derived in a non structural set-up it should purely
be treated as a parameter which determines ﬁnancial incentives of the labour supply
ﬂexible family.
3.3 Identifying the sharing parameter
Since the labour supply is modelled in a discrete model the calibration of the αh
parameter has to be conducted using expected probabilities of the discrete states.
Deﬁne the expected probability of being in employment state e of a family l in a SFH
who is actually observed in state e to be:
ˆ Pl(j = e|ˆ β,Zl,Yl,Lj,j = e), (4)
where Yl and Lj are vectors of disposable incomes and leisure in all labour market
states j family l can choose from.
Analogously, let’s deﬁne the expected probability of being in employment state e
of an individual i in a MFH who is actually observed in state e, to be:






h,Lj,j = e), (5)
where Y NS
i and Y NS
h are vectors of the family’s and other household members’
incomes at each labour market scenarios j available to family i, and αk
h is a speciﬁc
value of αh such that αk
h ∈ [0,1].
11For each chosen value of αk
h and for every chosen pair of observations i and l we













In equation 6 the distance ϕ
h,k
i,l is expressed as a squared diﬀerence of the sums of
expected probabilities of being employed (j > 0). For a given set of Y NS
i , Y NS
h and Yl




also be diﬀerent for a given set of Y NS
i , Y NS
h and αk
h and for varying levels of ﬁnancial
incentives of the SFH, Yl.
The last piece in the jigsaw to identify the α parameter is the appropriate way to
match the single adult families in SFHs and MFHs. In our application this is done
using employment propensity score matching. For every single adult family in a MFH
we match a number N of “nearest” single adult families living in SFHs. We conduct the
matching separately for men and women and it is done conditional on the observed
employment status. More precisely, we estimate the employment propensity for all
single adults based on detailed educational and regional information, the health status
and age.5 In this sense this estimation can be seen as a reduced-form labour market
participation model without accounting directly for the ﬁnancial incentives. We have
experimented with several speciﬁcations of the employment propensity, by making use
of the part time information and allowing for ﬂexible interactions.6
The distance ϕ
h,k
i,l can be computed for a chosen number of diﬀerent values of the
sharing parameter α for every MFH for each of the nearest SFHs. This results in N
diﬀerent values of the α. The average of N α’s (weighted by the proportional distance
in propensity scores) is taken to represent the household sharing parameter.
4 Estimating the labour supply
As discussed above, the identifying assumption for the estimation of the labour supply
behaviour of single individuals in MFHs is that they have the same preferences for
5Estimation results can be obtained by the authors upon request.
6To relax the assumption about non-random selection in MFHs and SFHs we have estimated
a discrete choice model of participation with random eﬀects. However, given the cross-sectional
variation, the identiﬁcation of this model was not reliable.
12consumption and work as individuals in SFHs. For the latter group we can estimate
the preferences conditional on observable characteristics directly from the data in
a static structural discrete choice model of labour supply, as e.g. in Aaberge et al.
(1995) or in van Soest (1995). The estimated coeﬃcients are then used to describe the
conditional preferences for consumption and work of singles in MFHs which allows the
identiﬁcation of the sharing parameters given the observed labour market behaviour
of singles in MFHs.
The discrete choice approach for the estimation of labour supply behaviour has
the essential advantage over a continuous speciﬁcation of the working hours that the
non-linearities in the budget set caused by the tax and transfer system can be easily
incorporated and that the potential endogeneity problem of income can be solved.
Moreover, the information on working hours in the Polish BBGD data is classiﬁed into
three discrete categories as: no work, part-time and full-time. The Polish distribution
of hours worked (available for example in the Polish LFS data) suggests that most part-
time employment is half-time, and we assume this to be the case for all who declare
part-time employment in the BBGD. The three points of work intensity describe the
working behaviour of the single households.
Thus consistent with the expression for the utility function of individuals living in
MFHs speciﬁed in Equation (3), we assume that a family l living on his or her own
receives utility Vlj at each discrete hours point j. This utility is assumed to depend on
a function U of disposable income Ylj which determines consumption, on demographic
characteristics Zl, on leisure Lj and on a random term lj:7
Vlj = U(Ylj,Zl,Lj) + ljj ∈ {1,2,...,J}.. (7)
Following McFadden (1974) we assume that the error terms lj follow an extreme
value distribution, and therefore the discrete choice model can be estimated by condi-








7More complex speciﬁcations with household speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity could not be iden-
tiﬁed.
13where dlj = 1 if j is the chosen alternative and 0 otherwise, and Pr(Yl = j) is the
choice probability for alternative j.
The household speciﬁc disposable income at each working alternative is derived
with the Polish microsimulation model SIMPL.8 We specify the leisure time as the
total weekly time budget minus the state speciﬁc working hours. Income and leisure
enter in a linear quadratic speciﬁcation. Preferences for income and leisure are made
conditional on age, education and regional information.9 For identiﬁcation the observ-
ables are interacted with the state speciﬁc net-household income and the leisure time.
Table 3 presents results of the labour supply estimation separately for men and women
who live in SFHs. In addition, we present estimation results for what we call the “ex-
tended standard” model, i.e. a labour supply model including singles living in SFHs
and MFHs. In this speciﬁcation incomes of the LS-ﬂexible families are taken at the
family level assuming no sharing, but we account for the additional household income
in MFHs to control for its eﬀect on labour market behaviour. This treatment does
not explicitly take account of potential sharing, but it represents an extension of the
standard approach in cases of complex households. This speciﬁcation will be used as
a benchmark for comparing the performance of the calibrated model below.
The interpretation of the estimated coeﬃcients is not too informative due to the
numerous interactions and the non-linearity of the discrete choice model. Instead we
derive labour supply elasticities based on the estimated coeﬃcients which describe
the working behaviour. We derive the change in the participation rate measured
in percentage points with respect to a 1% increase in gross hourly wages. We use a
calibration method which is consistent with the probabilistic nature of the model at the
individual level (Creedy and Duncan, 2002). It consists of drawing for each household
a large number of J random terms from the extreme value distribution that generates a
perfect match between predicted and observed choices. The same draws are kept when
predicting labour supply responses to a shock on wages. Averaging individual supply
responses over a large number of draws provides robust transition matrices. The mean
elasticities are presented in the bottom of the table. Interestingly, the elasticities for
men are higher than women. This is true when focussing only at the SFHs as well when
considering the full sample. For SFHs the change in the participation rate amounts to
8For more details on the Polish microsimulation model see Bargain, Morawski, Myck, and Socha
(2007).
9For descriptive statistics see Section 2.
14Table 3: Labor Supply Estimation
Men Women
(SFH) (ALL) (SFH) (ALL)
Income x Age -0.422 -0.389 -0.56 -0.381
(0.443) (0.277) (0.269) (0.182)
Income x Age2 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.005
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Income x University degree -4.332 -9.113 -2.789 -2.72
(1.650) (1.194) (0.723) (0.523)
Income x Urban Area 1.136 -0.883 -1.842 -1.702
(1.197) (0.746) (1.023) (0.619)
Income x Equiv. HH income - 0.414 - -0.316
(0.765) (0.512)
Income 11.327 -0.345 6.803 3.768
(9.903) (5.653) (5.801) (3.861)
Income2 0.935 5.099 1.340 1.171
(1.304) (1.011) (0.279) (0.217)
Income x Leisure 0.025 0.125 0.12 0.102
(0.057) (0.035) (0.020) (0.015)
Leisure x Age -0.01 -0.005 -0.017 -0.015
(0.01) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005)
Leisure x Age2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leisure x University Degree -0.085 -0.216 -0.112 -0.106
(0.047) (0.032) (0.027) (0.018)
Leisure x Urban Area 0.038 -0.007 -0.038 -0.036
(0.023) (-0.014) (0.022) (0.014)
Leisure x Equiv. HH Income - 0.04 - 0.025
(0.018) (0.016)
Leisure 0.190 -0.381 -0.210 -0.304
(0.256) (0.124) (0.166) (0.112)
Leisure2 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Number of observations 415 1177 733 1242
Log likelihood -236.5 -792.75 -369.96 -717.95
Labor supply elasticity 0.40 0.41 0.14 0.17
Notes: Standard errors are given in parentheses. According to Likelihood Ratio
Test coeﬃcients of income and leisure are jointly signiﬁcant at very high levels in
all estimations. Income is the state speciﬁc monthly net income simulated with
microsimulation model SIMPL. Labor supply elasticity is the mean change in the
participation rate given a 1% in gross wages.
150.4 for the mean of men and 0.14 for the mean of women. The ﬁnding contrasts with
gender speciﬁc labour supply elasticities in other countries which in general report
higher elasticities for single women, in particular single mothers. However, given the
characteristics of the population we consider the results seem plausible. As discussed
above, Polish single men in general tend to have lower education and lower wages than
single women and the participation rate of men and women is nearly the same. For
the full sample we ﬁnd a similar gender diﬀerence, with the elasticity of 0.17 for single
women and 0.41 for single men. It is important to note that including the MFHs in
the estimation, especially for men, does not change the elasticities in any important
way.
5 Calibrating the sharing parameter for singles in
MFHs
The calibration is conducted at the household level for 25 equally spaced values of
αh and in each case of a MFH we match N=10 “nearest” SFHs as described above.10
The distribution of the calibrated values is presented in Table 4, where the calibrated
values of α are divided into ﬁve categories. The results are presented separately for
men and women and conditional on the observed employment status.
Table 4: Distribution of the sharing parameter in two-family households
Men Women
Not employed Employed All Not employed Employed All
(column percentages)
0<= α <=0.2 7.2 31.1 20.2 12.6 32.8 27.1
0.2< α <=0.4 23.9 28.7 26.5 19.6 30.9 27.7
0.4< α <=0.6 23.1 23.6 23.4 25.9 18.9 20.8
0.6< α <=0.8 25.9 9.9 17.2 26.6 10.1 14.7
0.8< α <=1 19.9 6.7 12.7 15.4 7.4 9.6
Total observations 347 415 762 143 366 509
Notes: Calibrated values of the α parameter for households composed of a single person family (labour
supply ﬂexible) and another labour supply ﬁxed family. α = 0 implies no sharing, α = 1 implies full sharing
(as deﬁned in equation 1), while values of α in between imply some intermediate degree of sharing.
Source: Authors’ calculations using BBGD, 2005.
As we can see in Table 4 the method identiﬁes a signiﬁcant degree of within house-
10We conducted sensitivity analysis to check how results change to increasing the number of cali-
brated values for αh and it did not aﬀect the results.
16hold sharing of resources. Moreover the distribution of α parameters conditional on
employment status is consistent with our expectations concerning the ﬁnancial in-
centives individuals face on the labour market. For example while the values of the
sharing parameter are between 0 and 0.2 (i.e. no or little sharing) for only about 7% of
non employed men who live in MFHs, they are between 0.6 and 1.0 (i.e. a substantial
degree of sharing) for as many as 45.8%. On the other hand only 16.6% of employed
men live in MFHs with such a high degree of sharing and for 31.1% we identify no or
very little sharing. The pattern is similar for women, although it is slightly less pro-
nounced for the non employed sample. Among employed women we ﬁnd that 32.8%
live in households with little sharing and 7.4% in those with α between 0.8 and 1. It is
notable that for a very high proportion of single adults in MFHs we ﬁnd a high degree
of sharing. The α parameter is above 0.4 for 53.3% of men and 45.1% of women.
It is important to stress once more that what is being identiﬁed as α is the most
likely pattern of ﬁnancial incentives the individuals face on the labour market. Thus
the “degree of sharing” should not be interpreted in a structural way. For example,
the fact that there is no sharing or low degree of sharing does not mean that families
in these households do not share any of their costs of living or their meals. What
low values of α imply is that the single individuals we observe behave on the labour
market in such a way as if the ﬁnancial incentives they face were determined without
regard to incomes of other household members. This non-structural interpretation of
the sharing parameter should be suﬃcient to be able to describe the labour supply
behaviour of LS-ﬂexible individuals in MFHs. From this point of view knowing what
ﬁnancial incentives these individuals respond to is all we need to know to model the
eﬀect of changes in these incentives.
An important way to verify the validity of the calibrated parameters is to examine
the relationship of α’s to individual and household characteristics. One would expect
for example that apart from some correspondence to characteristics of individuals,
such as age or education, the calibrated values would also relate to characteristics
which have so far not been used in the analysis and which could play a role in de-
termining how resources are shared between the families.11 In Table 5 we present
results of regressing the calibrated α parameters on a set of individual and household
11In the terminology of the collective model of labour supply such characteristics could be termed
as “distribution factors”.
17Table 5: Determinants of the calibrated sharing parameters.
Speciﬁcation 1 Speciﬁcation 2
Coeﬀ. S.e. Sign. Coeﬀ. S.e. Sign
Constant 0.0204 (0.1387) 0.1243 (0.1262)
Employed - - -0.2198 (0.0135) ***
Age 0.0226 (0.0070) *** 0.0285 (0.0063) ***
Age squared -0.0003 (0.0001) *** -0.0004 (0.0001) ***
Higher education 0.1708 (0.0197) *** 0.2092 (0.0180) ***
Male 0.0295 (0.0210) -0.0078 (0.0193)
Lives in a village 0.0644 (0.0251) *** 0.0713 (0.0228) ***
Lives in a village * Male 0.0925 (0.0312) *** 0.0975 (0.0284) ***
OTH: Age diﬀerence -0.0012 (0.0009) -0.0016 (0.0008) *
OTH: higher education -0.0806 (0.0302) *** -0.0605 (0.0275) **
OTH: better educated 0.1145 (0.0245) *** 0.0874 (0.0224) ***
OTH: married -0.0345 (0.0267) -0.0488 (0.0243) **
OTH: married*male 0.0677 (0.0313) *** 0.0779 (0.0285) ***
OTH: parent/s -0.0620 (0.0212) *** -0.0838 (0.0193) ***
Number of observations: 1271 1271
R squared 0.1183 0.2713
Notes: OTH - characteristics related to the other (LS-ﬁxed) family.
Source: Authors’ calculations using BBGD, 2005.
characteristics (marked as OTH - for “other family” - in the table). We present two
speciﬁcations, one without and one with controlling for employment status. Employ-
ment strongly correlates with the value of α and as expected correlates negatively with
the degree of sharing. Higher education of the LS-ﬂexible family correlates positively
with sharing, and sharing increases with age. Households living in villages seem to
have a higher degree of sharing. We can also see that the calibrated parameters cor-
relate signiﬁcantly also with such characteristics as university education of the head
of the LS-ﬁxed family, and with education level of the head of the LS-ﬁxed family
being higher than the education of the LS-ﬂexible adult. Moreover marital status of
the LS-ﬁxed family also seems to matter. Interestingly living with an LS-ﬁxed couple
negatively correlates with the sharing parameter for women but positively for men.
The age diﬀerence between the head of the LS-ﬁxed family and the LS-ﬂexible adult
reduces the degree of sharing. Similarly if the LS-ﬂexible family is a child of the other
family (versus being parent or in some other relation) this also reduces the degree of
sharing.
185.1 Within-household sharing and labour supply elasticity
In the following we study in how far the identiﬁed degree of sharing matters for
analysing changes in working incentives. Below we compare the responsiveness of
individual labour supply for the model with calibrated sharing and for the “extended
standard” model in the case of two types of changes in ﬁnancial incentives:
• a 1% increase in the gross wage,
• a reduction in the employee rate of the disability Social Security Contribution
from 6.5% to 1.5%.
The ﬁrst change is a standard measure of labour supply elasticity, while the second
is a reform which was recently introduced in Poland (in two stages in July 2007 and
January 2008).
The responses to these changes in ﬁnancial incentives are computed in the same
way as in the model for SFHs in Section 4. Elasticities are numerically derived using
draws from the error terms and measure the change in the participation rate following
the increases in the disposable net incomes. In Tables 6 and 7 we present two sets of
responses for each of the reforms. One set is based on the calibrated approach while
the other on the “extended standard” model described in Section 4 (below referred to
as the “ES model”). Results are shown separately for men and women. In the Tables
mean responses are shown for each subgroup deﬁned by the value of the calibrated α as
in Table 4. The tables also show average responses for the entire sample of LS-ﬂexible
families in MFHs.
Comparing the labour supply eﬀects using the two diﬀerent methods, we ﬁnd some
important variation by the category of the calibrated α parameter. However, the
diﬀerences in overall means are relatively small. The mean gross wage elasticity for
men in the ES model is 0.50, while in the calibrated approach it amounts to 0.56,
i.e. only about 10% higher. For women the values are respectively 0.17 and 0.12, i.e.
about 30% lower. By the ﬁve categories of the sharing parameter the diﬀerences of the
elasticities are striking. For example for men living in households with α between 0.2
and 0.4 the elasticity in the ES model is 0.52, while that obtained with the calibrated
method is 0.81. For those in the highest α category (0.8 < α <= 1), the elasticities
19Table 6: Gross wage labour supply elasticity by household
sharing rule
Men Women
ES model Calibrated α ES model Calibrated α
0<= α <=0.2 .25 .35 .14 .12
0.2< α <=0.4 .52 .81 .12 .10
0.4< α <=0.6 .52 .53 .19 .17
0.6< α <=0.8 .76 .64 .20 .10
0.8< α <=1 .46 .32 .32 .04
all .50 .56 .17 .12
Notes: Elasticities are numerically derived and measure the relative change in
the participation rate assuming a 1% increase in gross hourly wage for LS-ﬂexible
families. The extended standard (ES) model uses jointly estimated preferences
for MFHs and SFHs and controls for household composition in the estimation.
Elasticities in “Calibrated α” scenario are based on the calibrated household
sharing rules.
Source: Authors’ calculations using BBGD, 2005.
Table 7: Labour supply response following SSC-reform by
household sharing rule
Men Women
ES model Calibrated α ES model Calibrated α
0<= α <=0.2 1.54 2.08 0.63 1.01
0.2< α <=0.4 3.47 4.68 0.77 0.84
0.4< α <=0.6 3.41 3.63 0.90 0.98
0.6< α <=0.8 4.40 3.73 1.54 0.71
0.8< α <=1 3.01 2.17 1.49 0.38
all 3.16 3.43 0.94 0.85
Notes: Elasticities are numerically derived and measure the relative change in the
participation rate assuming a reduction in the SSC employee contributions (by
5 percentage points). The extended standard (ES) model uses jointly estimated
preferences for MFHs and SFHs and controls for household composition in the
estimation. Elasticities in “Calibrated α” scenario are based on the calibrated
household sharing rules.
Source: Authors’ calculations using BBGD, 2005.
are respectively 0.46 and 0.32. For women the highest diﬀerences are for those living
in households with high degree of sharing. For females living in households with
0.6 < α <= 0.8 the elasticity in the ES model is twice as high as that in the calibrated
model, while for the highest α category it is 0.32 in the ES model but only 0.04 if we
account for sharing using the calibrated method.
The comparison of the labour supply responses derived using the diﬀerent methods
highlights the importance to account for income sharing in a comprehensive way. The
ES model underestimates the elasticity for individuals living in households with low
degree of sharing, but it overestimates it for households with high degree of sharing.
20This bias is in line with the wrong depiction of the work incentives in the ES model.
Work incentives for singles with a low degree of sharing are relatively strong as working
income is the only source of income. On the other side, a high level of sharing can
be seen as a transfer that reduces the work incentives. In contrast to the calibration
method, the ES model does not account for the diﬀerent sharing pattern and ceteris
paribus the other family income provides the same incentives for all values of α.
The diﬀerences can be seen for the gross wage elasticity for men (Table 6), and
both for men and women in the case of the reaction to the SSC reform (Table 7).
Looking at the results of the SSC reform, we ﬁnd that the ES-model underestimates
the response by about 26% for men (1.54 vs. 2.08) and by 38% for women (0.63 vs.
1.01) in the case of MFHs with α below 0.2. On the other extreme, for households
with α greater that 0.8, it overestimates it for men by about 40% (3.01 vs. 2.17) and
for women by almost four times (1.49 vs. 0.38).
Thus, while the ES model seems to estimate the average response broadly right
relative to the calibrated method, it may imply very wrongful predictions for diﬀerent
subgroups conditional on the degree of sharing in their households.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have proposed a method to account for income sharing in MFHs which
provides the possibility to analyse labour supply responses in complex households. In
developing countries as well as in transition economies multi-family households are very
common and are often an important source of income insurance. In this respect, multi-
family households partly substitute for governmental transfer programs. Therefore, it
seems that without a way to account for sharing of resources among families within
households, modelling of work incentives and individual labour supply responses within
such complex households may be incorrect.
Our approach is related to recent applications of the collective household model
based on estimation and calibration techniques to identify the degree of resource shar-
ing and labour supply responses. The important diﬀerence is that our approach is
non-structural since we cannot specify the standard utility function over leisure and
consumption for the LS-ﬁxed families. However, similar to the method proposed in
21Vermeulen et al. (2006), our key identifying assumption is that preferences over in-
come and leisure of speciﬁc family types living in single and multi-family households
are the same conditional on observable characteristics.
With this assumption we identify the degree of sharing for Polish single men and
women living together with another LS-ﬁxed family. The results suggest a substantial
degree of sharing in the multi-family households, and are consistent with the observed
labour market status of single adults living in the MFHs. The degree of sharing is neg-
atively correlated with the probability of being employed. The analysis also conﬁrmed
an important role of several characteristics of the LS-ﬁxed family as determinants of
the sharing rule. The sharing parameter correlates with age and education diﬀerences
between the families, with the marital status of the LS-ﬁxed family, and the relation
between the families.
We ﬁnd that calibrating the income sharing in MFHs is important to derive labour
supply responses of single men and women. Whereas on average a standard labour sup-
ply model which is conditioned on other household income predicts similar labour sup-
ply elasticities as the proposed model, the simulated labour supply response markedly
diﬀers by the degree of sharing. While the standard model underpredicts the response
for households with low degree of sharing, it substantially overpredicts the elasticity
of households identiﬁed with high degree of sharing.
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Appendix: ﬁgures and additional tablesFigure 1: Degree of sharing and implied replacement ratios for singles in MFHs
Single men no children, Single women, no children
1A 1B
Note: Replacement ratios computed as a ratio of income out of work to income in full-time work. Vertical lines represent
respective median RRs.
Source: Authors’ calculations using the SIMPL micro-simulation model. BBGD 2005.
Table 8: LS ﬂexible families and their households
Couples Couples Couples Single Total
both ﬂexible man ﬂexible woman ﬂexible
(a-couple) (m-couple) (f-couple)
No other family 7,105 1,216 1,022 2,258 11,601
One other F, LS ﬁxed 1,510 315 240 1,732 3,797
Two other F, both LS ﬁxed 261 70 48 221 600
Three or more other F, all LS ﬁxed 26 4 8 33 71
One other F, LS ﬂex a-couple 64 41 49 324 478
One other F, LS ﬂex m-couple 41 4 16 166 227
One other F, LS ﬂex f-couple 49 16 14 148 227
One other F, LS ﬂex single 324 166 148 480 1,118
Two other F, one LS ﬂex a-couple, one ﬁxed 22 7 14 121 164
Two other F, one LS ﬂex m-couple, one ﬁxed 7 0 1 72 80
Two other F, one LS ﬂex f-couple, one ﬁxed 14 1 8 37 60
Two other F, one LS ﬂex single, one ﬁxed 121 72 37 446 676
Other 91 52 46 546 735
Total 9,635 1,964 1,651 6,584 19,834
Source: Authors’ classiﬁcation using BBGD, 2005.
25Table 9: LS ﬂexible singles and their households.
Without children With children
Men Women Total Men Women Total
No other family 415 733 1148 68 1042 1110
One other F, LS ﬁxed 762 509 1271 35 426 461
Two other F, both LS ﬁxed 88 77 165 6 50 56
Three or more other F, all LS ﬁxed 16 9 25 1 7 8
One other F, LS ﬂex a-couple 168 126 294 1 29 30
One other F, LS ﬂex m-couple 100 57 157 0 9 9
One other F, LS ﬂex f-couple 80 57 137 1 10 11
One other F, LS ﬂex single 154 223 377 13 90 103
Two other F, one LS ﬂex a-couple, one ﬁxed 77 36 113 0 8 8
Two other F, one LS ﬂex m-couple, one ﬁxed 49 20 69 0 3 3
Two other F, one LS ﬂex f-couple, one ﬁxed 22 11 33 0 4 4
Two other F, one LS ﬂex single, one ﬁxed 227 157 384 5 57 62
Other 308 169 477 7 62 69
Total 2466 2184 4650 137 1797 1934
Source: Authors’ classiﬁcation using BBGD, 2005.
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